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The

Teacher

Comparative Political Philosophy and Liberal Education:
"Looking for Friends in History"'
Stephen G. Salkever, Bryn Mawr College
Michael Nylan, Bryn Mawr College
Over the past eight years, we
have jointly taught a series of
courses comparing Chinese and
European political philosophy.
These courses have convinced us
that teaching comparative political
philosophy is a way of doing two
eminently desirable-but seemingly
incompatible-things at once:
broadening the college curriculum
by teaching texts from outside the
Western tradition, and carrying out
the historical job of liberal education by teaching students to become critical and articulate readers
of interpretable texts. In our experience, there is no necessary incompatibility between liberal education and internationalizing the
curriculum. To the contrary, we
believe that at present neither of
them will flourish without the
other. We think that friends of the
"great books" and friends of "multiculturalism" can and should share
an extensive common ground, a
ground we try to clarify here by
making some proposals about the
character of liberal education and
by discussing ways in which teaching comparative political philosophy has helped us put these proposals into practice.

Defining the Problem
The kind of teaching that we
(like most teachers of political theory) are comfortable with introduces students to books that
present a variety of implicit and
explicit claims about how lives
should be lived and communities
organized. These books are chosen
on the basis of several not always
238

harmonious criteria: their historical
importance (since part of liberal
education is coming to terms with a
particular historical past or tradition); the extent to which they are
open to conflicting interpretations
(since critical interpretation and
argument about the meaning of
words and things is the practice
that defines the liberal classroom);
and the extent to which they can
be read with an eye to questions
and problems of the present (since
liberal education is justified largely
by its capacity to encourage deliberation and informed action in the
future).
In deciding what books to teach,
we worry less about adhering to
conventional genre distinctions
than about finding books that demand active and critical response,
ones that incline us to reconsider
the past and to imagine ourselves
as participants in a continuing
"conversation" about the shape of
life in the future. Our goal in the
classroom is not to transmit facts
or values in any simple way; we
aim to foster the preferences,
skills, and habits of mind that support lives of persistent curiosity
and self-reflection.
Liberal education understood in
this way involves a balance of different and sometimes conflicting
goods, so it is perhaps not surprising that the very notion of liberal
education has been the subject of
heated debate in America for most
of this century. Nor should it surprise us that the most rhetorically
successful formulations about liberal education are those that implicitly deny its complexity by reducing it to one of its constituent

elements.2 The current "canon
wars" illustrate this drift to oversimplification. It is difficult not to
feel both sympathy and impatience
with traditionalist arguments that
the core of American liberal education should be a reverent celebration of the classics of the Western
tradition, which are taken to provide permanent standards for judgments of truth and beauty. It is no
less difficult not to feel conflicting
emotions when presented with the
usual radical arguments that such
reverence papers over conflicts and
injustices.
Traditionalists are right in claiming that an education refusing to
engage Plato and Shakespeare as
important teachers is short-sighted
and thin. But radicals are right to
insist that lists of books to be
taught are not necessary phenomena imposing themselves on us like
fate or a god, but constructed
courses of study, establishing or
preserving a particular version of
the connection between the past
and the present. The radicals are
also right to insist that in developing college curricula we attend to
changes in the character of the
American undergraduate population
and the society as a whole, recognizing that the classroom is no
longer the exclusive preserve of
white males, and that by the end of
the decade European-Americans
will no longer comprise a majority
of the American population.
Traditionalists are wrong not to
see these changes in the direction
of a more diverse society as opportunities rather than threats, not to
consider that "one of the most liberating effects of liberal education
PS: Political Science & Politics
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is in coming to see one's own culture as one possible form of life
and sensibility among others."3 But
the radicals are wrong to think that
the only appropriate stance toward
books traditionally included in the
canon is that of the avenging unmasker; worse, they may be blind
to the way the analytic and evaluative categories that drive their radicalism rest on an unreflective privileging of one voice within that
traditional canon, often a Marxist
or a Nietzschean voice, rather than
on genuine alternatives to the
canon as such.
What is particularly exasperating
about the canon wars debate is that
both sides, in their eagerness to
score points against each other,
tend to ignore the most powerful
ideological force in contemporary
American undergraduate education-the practically hegemonic
doctrine that such education must
be organized on the lines of the
academic disciplines as defined by
the leading research universities.
The dominance of this orthodoxy
of disciplinary specialization seems
to guarantee that the battles between traditionalists and radicals
will be little more than noisy
squabbles over limited stretches of
curricular turf.
For the majority of the American
professoriate, liberal education is
nothing other than the name we
give to a collection of different
scholarly disciplines, and the heart
of such education at the college
level is rigorous training in a major.
As disciplinary sub-specialties proliferate4 and technical vocabularies
multiply, the likelihood becomes
less and less that the college
courses offered by the major disciplines will have much to contribute
to the project of liberal education
as we understand it.5 The canon
wars adversaries, the radicals and
the traditionalists, each oversimplify a complex task, but both
know that liberal education cannot
be taken to equal the sum of established research disciplines. Our
problem, then, as teachers of political philosophy, lies in finding ways
to embrace the partial goods championed separately by traditionalism
and radicalism, while at the same
time maintaining the kind of rigor
June 1994

that has come to be associated almost exclusively with scholarly
work in the disciplines.

But Is It Really
"Philosophy"?
When we began to plan our first
course in Chinese and Greek political philosophy, we welcomed the
chance to learn to read and discuss
new and interesting books, with
students and with each other. One
of us is a specialist in Greek political philosophy who knew practically nothing about China; the
other a specialist in the Chinese
classics who knew little about
Greece. We have since then jointly

Our problem, then, as
teachers of political
philosophy, lies in finding
ways to embrace
the partial goods
championed separately
by traditionalism and
radicalism, while at the
same time maintaining
the kind of rigor that
has come to be
associated almost
exclusively with scholarly
work in the disciplines.
taught three courses combining
Chinese and European texts. Each
course begins from a particular
problem that seems to be shared by
Chinese and European thinkers,
and the principal activity in all of
them is a close reading of a relatively small number of works.6
For example, our first course, on
the origins of philosophy in China
and Greece, began with what has
been called the Socratic question,
"What sort of life should I lead,"
the question that Plato's Socrates
compels his interlocutors to con-

front in the Republic and the Gorgias. Plausibly seen as the event
that initiates moral and political
philosophy in the West, we suggest
that Socrates' question can with
equal justice be called Confucius's
question, insofar as Confucius like
Socrates insists that his pupils ask
novel and profound questions about
their society and its practices-all
the while denying that he has anything new to teach.7
To make a long story short, we
treat Confucius and Socrates not as
authors of doctrines to compare,
nor as representative thinkers of
their respective "cultures,"8 but as
figures who use analogous modes
of unsettling, critical self-inquiry.
Socrates does this by insisting on a
fresh examination of familiar concepts like excellence (arete) and
good (agathon), and placing familiar patterns of social life, such as
laws (nomoi) and crafts (technai),
in a new light in a way that leads to
further reflection; Confucius problematizes the traditional meanings
assigned to familiar terms like humanity (jen), ceremony (li), and the
gentleman (chin tzu), and does so
in such a way that the reader is led
to connect particular terms and
practices with some elusive yet
somehow intelligible whole.9 Read
in this way, the Confucius and
Socrates our courses presuppose
are neither timeless thinkers abstracted from historical context nor
typical or official Chinese or Greek
voices; we are, to borrow a phrase
from the fourth-century B.C. Confucian philosopher, Mencius,
"looking for friends in history.'10
To this point we have been
speaking of Chinese philosophy
without remarking on the phrase.
But the idea that philosophy exists
only or primarily in the West-it is,
after all, a Greek word-has been
widespread, especially among those
identified with the contemporary
academic discipline that goes by
that name. The orthodox view is
stated by John Passmore, in his
article, "Philosophy," in the latest
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Passmore sharply distinguishes true philosophy from poetry or sagehood
(both of which he regards as the
same woolly minded thing): discourse counts as philosophy if it is
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a "clear, articulate, discussible system of ideas and principles." Given
that criterion for philosophy, Passmore says that, "What is commonly called 'Chinese philosophy'
. . consists almost entirely of the
pronouncements of sages" (Passmore, 1967, 216-18).
This notion of how to separate
philosophy from other forms of expression is widespread, and is the
way the term philosophy is used in
academic departments of philosophy within the Anglo-American
analytic tradition.1 But this is a
conception of philosophy that is
historically limited and tied to controversial substantive presuppositions about the character of inquiry
and reality. The notion of philosophy as systematic and as free from
ambiguity as possible12 dates from
the seventeenth-century efforts of
Descartes, Hobbes, and Spinoza to
establish a basis of absolute certainty for scientific inquiry, modified by Kant's eighteenth-century
shift of analytic focus from the
foundations of world to the foundations of human understanding.
Such a conception of philosophy
excludes not only Chinese philosophy but pre-modern Europeans like
Plato and Aristotle, who were anything but systematic and who rejected the idea that the system and
precision of mathematics or symbolic logic provide appropriate
models for philosophic reasoning
and philosophic discourse.13
Every philosopher wishes to be
as systematic and univocal as possible-the substantive disagreement
between Passmore and the Cartesians on the one hand and the ancient Chinese and Greek thinkers
on the other is over the extent to
which it is necessary to call attention to and preserve verbal ambiguity, and to use modes of argument
other than deductive entailment in
order to give a picture of the world
that clarifies rather than distorts the
human situation.
There is another way of conceiving philosophy, one that fits our
intentions better without including
every kind of belief or expression.
Philosophy brings to consciousness
and articulateness those prevailing
orientations toward and beliefs
about individuals, society, and the
240

cosmos that are otherwise tacit-in
effect, philosophy begins with the
Socratic/Confucian question about
how we should live, and not with
the Cartesian or Kantian impulse
toward certainty and system. Philosophizing of the Socratic/Confucian kind indeed demands a certain
kind of rationality by insisting that
reasons be given for accepting as
good or true what we might otherwise do or believe out of ancient
custom or pious awe-but this is
not rationality on the model of deductive proof, and it may well be
one that calls for expression in poetry or aphorism or story rather
than bare prose.14 This conception
of rationality presupposes a world
in which our fundamental questions
have greater stability and permanence than any answers we may
give them. The point of philosophizing in such a world is to bring
those questions to consciousness,
not to supply precise and absolute
solutions.
Philosophy thus appears as an
ever-present human possibility,
rather than the systematized and
mathematicized thought of a particular individual or group; the danger
to be avoided here is the reduction
of practical philosophic inquiry to
scientistic "ethnophilosophy. "15
Comparative philosophy must resist
the inclination to explain philosophic texts of a particular culture
as superstructural representations
of the "essence" of that culture
(Nussbaum and Sen 1989, 302). We
are all familiar with the better
known examples of this infectious
temptation.
In comparing Chinese and Greek
texts, for example, we may be told
that the key to their meaning lies in
material conditions,16 or in the attributes of one culture that seem to
be "missing" in the other; for example the asserted "absence" of a
"scientific revolution" or of the
verb "to be" (Graham), or of cosmogonic myths (Mote), or of individual military heroes (Keightley)
in China. Such "missing" attributes are used by different authors to demonstrate either the inferiority or the superiority of
Chinese to Europeans,17 but whatever their evaluative use, "missing
attribute" analyses elevate a partial

truth to the status of a core explanatory reality, and in the process
make each text and culture so exotic to the other that any inter-textual or inter-cultural dialogue becomes impossible.18

Course Planning Strategies
In designing courses, we have
avoided organizing the syllabuses
as surveys; instead, we try to have
each course focus on one permanent human problem confronted in
two very different places: for instance, how to think one's way
outside the limits of prescribed social roles; how to imagine and respond to death; or how to combine
innovation and continuity in societies where traditional authority has
been shaken. Of course, each
philosophic text speaks to a number of interesting problems, so
class discussion will inevitably (and
rightly) drift into a number of areas
unrelated to the initial problem
used to organize the course.
The word we choose to name the
context in which these problems
arise-whether culture, or world of
thought (following Benjamin
Schwartz), or tradition-is not important, but the problem of how we
understand that context matters a
great deal and needs to be carefully
considered by those of us interested in reading philosophic texts
in a comparative way. We need to
avoid going too far in the direction
of reducing texts to context by
treating them as a mere products of
culture forces; such a reductive
explanation makes it impossible to
take the text seriously as a
"friend" to argue with. But we
also need to avoid the opposite error of treating the texts as absolutely context-free, as isolated miracles of timelessness whose authors
were our immediate contemporaries, for this would be to discount
the difficulties inherent in translating and understanding our "friends."
In other words, in comparative
philosophy we need to bear in mind
both the existence of boundaries
and the possibility of boundary
crossing. To appreciate the strangeness of a text while at the same
time looking for ways to connect
PS: Political Science & Politics
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its language to ours, it may help to
borrow Gadamer's notion of the
"horizon," by which he means the
questions to which each text can be
seen as an answer.19 To establish a
"horizon" for an intelligent first
reading of Plato's Apology or the
Confucian Analects, we need a
sense of fifth-century Athens or Lu
so that we can bring the appropriate questions to our texts. But the
texts must then be seen as active
and individual responses to those
questions-not as what the typical
Greek or Chinese philosopher
would say.20
There is no single right way to
organize comparative courses, but
there are several considerations we
think are important. First, in planning the course, do not set it up as
two consecutive historical survey
courses (e.g., half a term on Chinese classics followed by half a
term on Greek classics). The object
is to draw tentative comparisons
between individual texts from different traditions as soon as possible. As you can see from the appended syllabuses, we've tried to
do this in various ways. We have
also discovered that almost any
pairing of two texts can work, so
that it is pointless to agonize over
whether Plato is better paired with
Confucius or Chuang Tzu. As the
course proceeds, comparisons can
be made freely both within and
across cultures, so long as one always bears in mind that the point
of these comparisons is not to
come up with or test the truth of
generalizations about cultural similarities and differences,21 but to become more sensitive and more active listeners to the individual
voices in the books we read.
Second, it seems to work better
to organize courses around problems that arise in the texts and in
our lives, rather than chronologically or by concepts central to contemporary disciplinary concerns. It
wouldn't make sense, for example,
to have a course structured around
the problem of how the ancient
Chinese writers might come down
on the issue of communitarianism
versus Rawlsian liberalism. Nor
should you aim at a thorough historical survey, although we have
found that dealing with works from
June 1994

roughly the same historical period
helps keep students from feeling
hopelessly at sea. The particular
content of the course should be
determined by the people who are
going to teach it, and will reflect
their own interests and areas of
expertise, as do our three syllabuses printed below.

Writingfrequent papers
gives our students the
chance both to solidify
their understanding of
the readings and to try
out different ways of
constructing an active
response to different
kinds of texts.
This is also true of the mix of
books from different traditions-it
isn't necessary to have half from
one tradition and half from the
other. Nevertheless, it is important
to have some care about the proportions, lest students get the impression that one tradition is somehow more important and more
valuable because it is the source of
more of the readings. In our "Origins of Philosophy" class, the texts
are approximately half Chinese and
half Greek. In "Piety and Death"
and "Brave New Worlds," the
ratio is 2/3 European to 1/3 Chinese-since here there were three
teachers, two of us European specialists. This may be as unbalanced
as we would want to go.
Above all, we caution against
including only one non-Western
text in a course that is otherwise
strictly Western. It is absolutely
necessary to indicate that neither
the Chinese nor the Western tradition is monolithic, and that they are
interesting to us precisely because
they contain rich debates over substantial practical and theoretical
issues. To include one non-Western
book as if it somehow "represented" the Chinese, or, worse, the

"third world perspective," distorts
more than it illuminates.
The best way to avoid the urge
to turn books into emissaries from
exotic cultures is to familiarize
yourself as soon as possible with
the contending alternatives within
the tradition that is new to you as a
teacher. For those first encountering Chinese philosophy, Arthur
Waley's Three Ways of Thought in
Ancient China is a fine place to begin, as are Benjamin Schwartz's
Search for Wealth and Power and
World of Thought in Ancient
China, and A.C. Graham's Disputers of the Tao, since all these
books alert the reader to the complexity of the tradition as they dispel stereotypic conceptions of the
Chinese Geist.22
Once you have settled on texts,
the next question is how to balance
lecture and discussion-in other
words, how to balance the need for
establishing a contextual background against the need to allow
students to develop their own readings of the texts. Both are necessary, and finding the right mix will
depend on local factors. We have
done it in two ways: in the "Origins" course (an upper-level seminar), whoever is the specialist for
the day's reading leads the discussion, supplying background as necessary. In lower-level courses, one
lecture a week given by the resident expert precedes two weekly
meetings for discussion. It is a
good idea to modify the "experts
first" rule over time as the nonexpert faculty become more familiar
with new material; this makes it
clear that you don't have to be an
expert to raise good questions
about a text.
Finally, there is the matter of
student assignments. Putting a lot
of weight on quizzes and examinations, or on a long research or term
paper, is a sure way to undermine
the goals of the course. Students
should write as many short papers
as possible (between four and
seven papers a term), ideally of
varying length (from two to ten
pages). If students are required to
write a number of shorter papers,
the stakes involved in writing each
are lowered, and the chances for
improving over the course of the
241
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term are increased. Writing frequent papers gives our students the
chance both to solidify their understanding of the readings and to try
out different ways of constructing
an active response to different
kinds of texts. We give students
the option of rewriting their papers
at any time, since this encourages
the timid to take risks and allows
all students to check their own
progress.
Several types of paper topics
seem to work well. In general, in a
short paper it seems better to ask
students to focus on interpreting
one text while bringing others in as
points of comparison, since it takes
a great deal of sophistication to
give two complex texts equal
weight in a short paper without
oversimplifying. Three sorts of topics that have proved successful are
those that point to a moral or political dilemma that is seemingly left
unresolved by the text (such as the
conflict between familial and communal obligations posed by the
story of Upright Kung in Analects
13.18); those that take off from an
apparent tension between aspects
of a single text; and those that ask
students to respond to some controversial interpretation of the text
(such as J. B. White's critique of
Thucydides' Diodotus, or David
Wong's claim that Hsiin Tzu is a
"prototechnological" thinker). In
all of these, our aim is to have students move from very particular
moments in the text to broader
questions. One way to do this is to
ask students to consider themselves
modern disciples of the ancient
masters.
Our responses to these papers
are perhaps even more important
than our choice of paper topics.
We try to arrange that both of us
comment on the same paper, at
least some of the time, to let students see that a variety of approaches is possible. In larger
classes, of course, and for those
with heavier teaching loads than
our 3/2, this will not be possible.
But here one could still try experimenting with short, ungraded, written assignments (perhaps 15-20
minute in-class writings) that are
then discussed in small groups. At
any rate, thinking about the kind of
242

writing students do in these courses
should not be treated as separate
from thinking about the substance
of the course. It is not a matter of
evaluation and grading only: our
expectations about and responses
to student writing directly affect the
development of those interpretive
skills and habits needed to address
the Socratic/Confucian question.

Notes
1. A longer version of this paper, entitled "Teaching Comparative Political Philosophy: Rationale, Problems, Strategies, or,
On Trying To Avoid The Anthropologist/
Economist/Missionary Trilemma," was presented at the 1991 Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association, and
is available from the authors on request.
The subtitle refers to our attempt to teach
philosophical texts comparatively while
avoiding three things: the contextualist reduction of philosophy to an aspect of the
anthropologist's "culture"; the universalist
reduction of philosophy to an effect of the
economist's laws; and the moralistic reduction of philosophy to good and bad dogmas
by sectarian missionaries both religious and
secular.
2. As Tocqueville noted, busy democrats
tend to be addicted, against their own best
interests, to simplifying theories.
3. Searle, p. 39. Kermode's discussion
of the uses of "classic" texts is most helpful, especially for his account of the conflict
about how the classic should be represented, between those who see "the classic
as a closed book that learning can partly
open, and those who assert that the classic
is a more or less open text from which new
readings may be generated, not the charms
of antiquity imperfectly understood, but important new senses" (p. 75). Two other
strong nontraditional defenses of the centrality of classical texts for liberal learning are
Wayne Booth, The Company We Keep, and
Eva Brann, Paradoxes of Education in a
Republic.
4. And such proliferation is the way
scholarly disciplines typically resolve internal disputes, no matter how fundamental.
Both traditionalists and radicals are comfortably accommodated within the framework of
existing disciplines and the departmental
structure of research universities. Gerald
Graff's study of the history of American departments of English over the last hundred
years documents and discusses this tendency and its negative implications for liberal education. Graff's central point is that
radical challenges are typically resolved by
establishing new faculty positions for the
erstwhile radicals, rather than by a debate
about how the department should understand its purpose followed by a re-organization of the faculty in the light of that debate.
5. This dilemma is both recognized and
exemplified in the recent APSA report on
"Liberal Learning and the Political Science

Major" (Wahlke 1991). Recognizing that the
major should not be "a pre-professional program to train political scientists" (p. 50), but
reluctant to criticize or exclude any currently prominent research program, the report in effect throws up its hands at settling
on a set of questions or approaches to guide
undergraduate education and says that students should learn to ask, "Which particular
mode of analysis is appropriate to this particular question" (p. 52)-as if "modes of
analysis" had no part in setting both the
terms and the substance of the questions
they address. Kaufman-Osborne (1990)
makes a cogent historical argument for freeing our thoughts about the undergraduate
major from the "imperialism" of the research practices prevailing in graduate departments.
6. So far we have offered an upper-level
course on the origins of philosophy in China
and Greece several times, a sophomore-level
course on texts from the European and Chinese enlightenments, called "Brave New
Worlds," and a seminar for freshmen and
sophomores on ways of thinking about piety
and death in ancient China and Greece. We
could not have begun to teach any of these
courses without outside support to cover
our other course commitments. The development of the first course was supported by
a grant from the Ford Foundation; the other
two were funded by a Knight Foundation
grant.
7. This fundamental parallel between
Socratic and Confucian activity is brilliantly
drawn by Benjamin Schwartz (1985), 76-79.
Schwartz is pre-eminent among specialists in
early Chinese philosophy in his understanding of Greek philosophy, and hence in his
ability to draw thought-provoking comparisons between the two traditions. Any specialist in European political theory who
wants to begin reading the Chinese classics
would do well to read The World of Thought
in Ancient China at the first opportunity.
8. The structuralist trope of constructing
an invisible agent and calling it the "culture" of a people destroys philosophy, and
especially comparative philosophy, and is to
be avoided. The reification of culture belongs to anthropology, and is especially visible in traditional ethnographic functionalism,
which seems to operate on the maxim that,
as Aristotle didn't say, Culture makes nothing in vain. The word "society" has been
used similarly by sociologists like Durkheim,
for whom, Alan Wolfe says, "Society is like
the hero of an epic saga, possessing superhuman qualities at which ordinary mortals
can only wonder" (p. 221).
9. In the case of old words used in new
ways, Eno's discussion of the Confucian
texts suggests that it might be fascinating to
compare the way Plato and Aristotle use
phusis (roughly, nature) with the transformations of t'ien (roughly, heaven) in Confucius, Mencius, and Hsiin Tzu. For a very
interesting discussion of the similar work
done by dunamislenergeia (potentiality/actuality) in Aristotle and ch'i/li (energy/principle) in Chu Hsi, see Clark, pp. 212-16.
10. Mencius 5b8, p. 158 in the D. C. Lau
translation. Wayne Booth, with no reference

to Mencius, but with Aristotle's discussion
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Comparative
of friendship in mind, presents a similar way
of thinking about books. For Booth, the
value of reading is the creation of an ethical
culture in which we make friends with the
author of the text-not the historical author,
but the one implied or constructed by our
reading. "Friendship" here suggests various
kinds of friends-those who are simply fun
to be with because they flatter or amuse us,
those who are useful informants about
something that we need to know about, but
especially those who can criticize as well as
confirm our deepest commitments and habits.
11. One of the curious hallmarks of this
group is its tendency to claim that what it
does isn't "analytic" philosophy at all, it's
just plain philosophy, philosophy tout
court-after all, who could be against clarity
and articulateness? T. Irwin exhibits the
characteristic tone and substance of this refusal to grant even the possibility that the
term philosophy might be contested: "I
rather deprecate the use of the term AngloAmerican [his italics] to refer to a philosophical school or outlook. And I doubt if
there are any techniques characteristic of
contemporary Anglo-American (as opposed
to medieval Latin or eighteenth-century
German) philosophy" (in Griswold, p. 195).
12. A view of the character of philosophy
roughly similar to that of post-Cartesian
European philosophers-valuing strict deductive argument and aspiring to univocity
at all times-seems to have been held in
ancient China by the Mohist "logicians,"
whose writings were marginalized as impractical by later canon builders.
13. See the articles in Griswold for a
sense of the debate about Plato-interpretation between analytic philosophers and
others.
14. Schwartz (1985) discusses the emergence of philosophy understood in this way
in terms of Karl Jaspers' concept of the
"Axial Age," the period during the first millennium B.C., when a new kind of writing
and thought began to appear in several
places, including China and Greece, writing
in which one finds something different from
a priestly enunciation of prevailing codes
and beliefs, but instead, in Schwartz's
words, "a kind of standing back and looking
beyond; of questioning and reflectivity as
well as the emergence of new positive perspectives and visions" (p. 3). Robert Eno
makes an excellent case for reading the
Analects as a "philosophically self-conscious text" (p. 81) in these terms. Eno also
provides good readings of Mencius and
Hsiin Tzu as texts of this kind. For related
arguments about the philosophic character
of the Chuang Tzu, see Wu, especially pp.
266-77, and Hansen (1983); for Mencius, see
Yearley (1990). All stress the different ways
in which these authors insist on giving reasons rather than accepting rules or revelations, and the need to take seriously their
claims to true belief and persuasive argument if we are to be adequate readers. For a
comparable treatment of the meaning of
Socratic logos as something different from
either deductive logic or prophetic vision,
see Desjardins (1990).
15. For insightful discussions of this issue
and of the question of African philosophy in
June 1994

comparative perspective generally, see Appiah (1992) and Outlaw (1993).
16. For Jacques Gernet (pp. 26-29), the
primary explainer of cultural difference is
that the Greeks were seafarers and pastoralists, while the Chinese were settled agriculturists.
17. The "absence" of cosmogony
"causes" the Chinese to have a uniquely
organismic view of the universe, one that
makes no distinction between facts and values (Graham, p. 29), and one that never separates subjectivity from the world (Tu, p. 12),
one that sees value as immanent in the
world rather than a matter of external universal principle (Hall and Ames, pp. 32325)-in all these cases, the "absence" is
presented as the reason the Chinese have
been able to avoid some bad beliefs; or,
they can be used to show that the Chinese
never had a "scientific revolution" (Sivin's
critique of this way of stating the question is
very helpful) or a sense of individual
"rights"-these things being (usually) taken
to be good. The process here often seems to
be that an author adopts a prevailing (Western) critique of Western philosophy, generally one stemming from the Nietzschean
and/or Heideggerian critique of fundamental
ontology, and then proceeds to find that critique already present (though never, of
course, explicit-that's what our author is
for) in Chinese philosophy. Pocock (pp. 1718), speaking of the Westernizing distortions
in the readings of certain Chinese texts that
are inspired by the desire to discover a
Good Other that appears to manifest the opposite of everything we hate about ourselves, waxes appropriately satiric: "It is
very easy to understand the appeal of this
perception for moderns trying to live in a
post-individualist, post-industrial and probably post-revolutionary world . . . though
when it [the idea of the Taoist self and the
politics of the wu wei] is practised in faece
Calvini, among the debris of Protestant individualism, some very curious jetsam enters
the original current." (pp. 17-18).
18. See Girardot for an argument that the
question of Chinese cosmogony is much
more complex than the simple "absence"
analysis suggests; see Graham (pp. 389-428)
for similarly complicating the issue of expressions in Chinese (and other languages)
comparable to the English "to be" or the
Greek einai, and an interesting and appropriately inconclusive discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the different
formulations.
19. Gadamer, pp. 333-40. Gadamer takes
this idea-that the way to determine the
meaning of a text is to try to reconstruct the
question to which the text is an answerfrom the Autobiography of R. G. Collingwood.
20. "Thus a person who seeks to understand must question what lies behind what is
said. He must understand it as an answer to
a question .... We understand the sense of
the text only by acquiring the horizon of the
question that, as such, necessarily includes
other possible answers" Gadamer, p. 333.
21. Of course, hypotheses of this kind can
and should be floated all the time-but they
cannot become the goal of the course with-
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out subverting its purposes, at least as we
understand them. Schwartz (1964, p. 2)
notes that in discussing cross-cultural encounters we need to take care to avoid
treating cultures as static monoliths: "I
would suggest that in dealing with the encounter between the West and any given
non-Western society and culture, there can
be no escape from the necessity of immersing ourselves as deeply as possible in the
specificities of both worlds simultaneously.
We are not dealing with a known and an
unknown variable but with two vast, everchanging, highly problematic areas of human
experience."
22. For the social and political history of
pre-Ch'in China, Hsu Cho-yun, Ancient
China in Transition is a good introduction;
for the political context of Athenian philosophy, see J. Ober, Mass and Elite in Athenian Democracy.
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Appendix: Three Syllabuses
General Studies 204
Sophomore Humanities Seminar:
Brave New Worlds
Format and Assignments: Sections will
meet together on Wednesdays, separately for the other two weekly meetings. There will be seven short papers
assigned during the course, as indicated
below. In lieu of a final examination,
there will be an option of re-writing one
of the seven papers at the end of the
term.
Class Schedule:
Week 1 (January 23-27: Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince
Week 2 (January 30-February 3): The
Prince; Thomas More, Utopia.
Week 3 (February 6-10): Utopia.
First Paper Due More and/or Machiavelli (4-5 pages): Friday, Feb. 10.

University." New York Review of Books,

Second Paper Due (2 pages): Friday,
Feb. 17.

and Tradition in the Sciences: Essays in

Honor of I. Berard Cohen, ed. Everett
Mendelsohn.Cambridge:Cambridge
UniversityPress.

Tu Wei-Ming. 1985. Confucian Thought:
Selfhood as Creative Transformation.

Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
Wahlke,John C. 1991. "LiberalLearning
and the PoliticalScience Major:A Report to the Profession."PS: Political
Science & Politics, 24:48-60.
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Week 10 (April 3-7): Wang Yang-ming.
Fifth Paper Due (4-5 pages): Friday,
April 7

Thought in Ancient China. Cambridge,

December6, 34-42.
Sivin, Nathan. 1984. "Why the Scientific
RevolutionDid Not Take Place in China-or Didn't It?" In Transformation

Week 9 (March 27-31): Wang Yangming, Inquiry on the "Great Learning"; Instructions for Practical Living,
sections 2-7, 9-10, 15-16, 24, 26, 28,
30-34, 38, 44, 52, 58, 62, 76, 86, 99,
101, 122-123, 127, 134-136, 138-139,
195-200, 202, 222, 226, 228, 231, 272,
276, 279, 282, 293.

Wu, Kuang-Ming. 1990. The Butterfly as
Companion: Meditations on the First
Three Chapters of the Chuang Tzu. Al-

Week 4 (February 13-17): K'ang
Yu-wei, The One-World Philosophy of
K'ang Yu-Wei, Parts 1 and 2, plus one
of the later chapters of your choice (on
racism, sexism, etc.).

MA: BelknapPress.
Searle, John. 1990. "The Storm Over the

Fourth Paper Due (4-5 pages): Friday,
March 24

Week 5 (February 20-24: William
Shakespeare, The Tempest.
Week 6 (February 27-March 3): John
Milton, Paradise Lost, Books 1, 2, 3
(lines 1-143), 4, 5, 9, 10.
Third Paper Due Shakespeare (2 pages): Friday, March 3.
Week 7 (March 6-10): Paradise Lost.
Spring Break
Week 8 (March 20-24): Paradise Lost

Week 13 (April 24-28): Jonathan Swift,
Gulliver's Travels, Parts 1 and 3 (read
through once), Part 4 (read carefully).
Sixth Paper Due Descartes and/or Swift
(4-5 pages): Friday, April 28
Week 14 (May 1-5): Li Ju-chen, Flowers in the Mirror, pp. 17-133 in the Lin
Tai-yi translation (through the voyage
to the city of women).
Seventh Paper Due (2 pages): Monday,
May 8
Optional Rewrite due end of exam
period

Rationale for the Choice and
the Order of Reading
A standard periodization of European and Chinese cultural history lies
behind our choice of readings. For Europe, it is conventional to date the beginning of Western "modernity" from
around the beginning of the 16th century. This dating assumes that a set of
fundamental changes occurred during
the period 1500-1789: the breakdown of
the feudal order and the emergence of
unified nation-states; increasing encounter with non-European people and
extensive colonization; the flourishing
of commercial markets; the separation
of religious and political authority; the
emergence of modern natural science;
the separation of individual identity
from inherited social position. The European readings in the course provide
ways of naming and responding to
these transformations.
For Chinese intellectual history, it is
conventional to distinguish four periods. The first or ancient era runs from
about the 6th to the 2d century B.C.
(Spring and Autumn Annals and Warring States periods), and centers around
PS: Political Science & Politics
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the classical Confucian and Taoist
texts. The second period (sometimes
called "medieval" runs from the Han
to the Sung dynasties (up to the 10th
century A.D.), and features the entry
of Buddhism into the Chinese world.
The third (sometimes called "modern")
is the period of Sung (e.g., Chu Hsi)
and Ming neo-Confucianism (from the
11th through the 18th centuries), a series of attempts to consolidate and solidify the Confucian tradition in ways
that take account of the challenges of
Buddhism and of popular Taoism. Last
is the contemporary period, the 19th
and 20th centuries, characterized by
responses to the challenge of Europe.
We begin with Machiavelli and More
since both of them exhibit a dissatisfaction with the present order of society,
and an inclination to look backward as
a way of imagining a transformed
present-NM explicitly, by recommending the study of history, and More
(or Hythloday, at least) by calling up
the image of a simpler time or out-oftime. Both also suggest ideas of the
virtues that are against their age, and
present characters (Hythloday and the
Prince) who suggest the figure of the
modern "individual," the self-made
man. In each there is also a tension
between two central elements of the
Western tradition, Christianity and
classical republicanism. Both texts are
also complex in raising questions about
the relation of the author to the textMore to Hythloday, Machiavelli to his
Florentine counselor.
K'ang Yu-wei comes in at a much
later period, the 19th century Chinese
turn toward the West as threat and
promise, but we start here because we
think it's good to introduce China as
soon as possible, and because the issues here are more easily accessible to
students without any knowledge of
China than would be the case with earlier texts. K'ang Yu-wei's One-World
is a prediction of a utopian future that
rests on the premise that neo-Confucianism properly understood can be
made fully compatible with the essence
of European science and democracy.
Here we introduce the idea of a tradition resting upon a set of texts (the
Analects of Confucius and related commentaries) and the way controversial
interpretations of "sacred" texts can
serve to imagine social arrangements
and ways of life.
The Tempest introduces one European conception of West and nonWest, and continues the utopian theme,
along with introducing the genre of romance. Paradise Lost picks up the
theme of interpreting and "justifying"
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a sacred text begun in K'ang Yu-wei,
thinking about Milton's new version of
Genesis and the idea of an epic poetry
that celebrates the world as it is.
Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529) reacted
against the neo-Confucian orthodoxy
based on the works of Chu Hsi (11301200), who was the grand synthesizer
and codifier of earlier Chinese thought
during the turn to the "modern" period. Wang Yang-ming's was a kind of
inward turning, away from rationality
and inquiry associated with Chu Hsi,
toward insistence on innate knowledge
of the good, a connection between the
structure of the human soul (hsin) and
the structure of the cosmos, a unity of
thought and action-all made compatible with traditional filial piety.
Descartes also turns inward in his
self-consciously novel and anti-traditional rules for both intellectual and
moral conduct. To be stressed here is
the Cartesian dichotomy between spiritual and material things, and his attack
on the idea of tradition (including the
literary tradition) as such. The Discourse is to be read as a prospective
apologia for modern science as a practice or way of life. Genre questions
also arise here-what is a work of
"autobiography", "philosophy", "science", "fiction", "religion"?
Gulliver's Travels is to be read in
part as a critique of the aspirations of
the Cartesian Enlightenment, a satire
on the new world of science and commerce, one whose ending suggests a
picture of modernity as dilemma. We
end with Flowers in the Mirror (Li
Ju-chen, 1763-1830), a satiric, though
cheerful, novel of voyages to imaginary
lands that is in some respects a Chinese
Gulliver.

General Studies 204
Piety and Death: China and Greece
A consideration of some ways in which
writers in two cultural contexts gave
accounts of the lines separating and
connecting the human and the divine,
the living and the dead. The focus will
be on developing strategies for making
sense of challenging and unfamiliar
texts, and on figuring out how to get
texts from two different traditions to
speak to one another. No special background is presupposed, and there are
no prerequisites. The course has been
designed with sophomores and juniors
primarily in mind.
There will be six short papers (total
length, approximately 25 pages). The
papers will be on the texts discussed in
class. Because of its writing-intensive
character, the course is not open to

freshmen except those who are exempt
from English 015.
Schedule of Readings and Papers:
September 4 and 6: Introduction: Historical background: China in the Spring and
Autumn Annals and Warring States periods (722-222 B.C.E.) and the Athenian
polis in the 5th and 4th centuries B.C.E.
Consideration of selected sample Chinese and Greek texts from the period.
September 9, 11, 13: Sophocles (496406): Antigone
September 16, 18, 20: Plato (429-347):
Euthyphro
First paper due, September 23
September 23, 25, 27: Confucius (551479): Analects
Second Paper due, September 30
September 30, October 2, 4: Hsun Tzu
(about 310-230)
October 7, 9, 11: Hsun Tzu
October 14: Fall break
Third Paper due, October 16
October 16, 18: Thucydides (about 460400): Peloponnesian War
October 21, 23, 25: Thucydides
Fourth paper due, October 28
October 28, 30, November 1: Aristophanes (about 455-385): Birds
November 4, 6, 8: Euripides (about 485406): Helen
Fifth paper due, November 11
November 11, 13, 15: Chuang Tzu
(between 399 and 295)
November 18, 20, 22: Plato, Apology and
Crito
November 25: Plato
Sixth paper due, November 27
November 27: Ying Shao, "On Marvels
and Spirits"
November 29: Thanksgiving break
December 2, 4, 6: Euripides: Bacchae
December 9: Bacchae
There will be a self-scheduled final
examination.
Rationale for the Choice and the
Order of the Readings
We see the books and authors we
have chosen not as representatives of
standard Greek or Chinese opinions
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about piety and death, but as texts that
introduce problems and perplexities
about these matters, and are as a result
open to a variety of interpretations and
re-interpretations. The order of readings is therefore neither chronological
nor one-culture or one-genre-at-a-time,
but designed to generate as high a level
of interpretive comparison among texts
as possible, both in class discussions
and in student papers.
We will begin with the Antigone because it seems the most accessible and
exciting point of entry into thinking and
speaking about the obligations of the
living to the dead, about possible conflicts between family and citizenship,
and about the tensions between understanding the human world in terms of
secular interest and understanding it in
terms of our exchanges with divinity.
The Antigone is also valuable as a text
with several distinct voices and considerable uncertainty about how we are to
understand them. Plato's Euthyphro
continues all of these questions concerning the relationship of the polis to
divinity as well as bringing out another
that is also implicit in Antigone: What
is the relationship of the philosopher or
poet to both polis and the gods?
Confucius' Analects allows us to talk
about the issues of piety and death in
relation to a text that is aphoristic
rather than dramatic, and so to confront and articulate a different form of
uncertainty in interpretation. The uncertainty and the question of possible
irony is especially complex here, since
Confucius is famous for his asserted
unwillingness to speak about spirits or
the dead. Moreover, Confucius insists
that he is saying nothing new in his
own voice, but instead transmitting and
reviving a faded and precious antiquity.
His love of the past, however, is not a
passive reverence or a turning away
from the present but the basis and incentive for proposing what he calls a
correction or rectification of language.
How can his stance-that of the
teacher or scholar-toward "the tradition" be compared with that of the
poet or the philosopher in Athens?
What new insights and questions can
such comparison yield?
In trying to make sense of the Confucian concepts of filial piety (hsiao),
goodness (jen), virtue or moral force
(te), and rites of ceremony (li), among
others, we have the chance to introduce the general question of similarities
and differences, analogies and disanalogies between The Analects and the
texts of Sophocles and Plato studied
earlier-an interpretive procedure that
can be continued throughout the
course. We can also begin to consider
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some larger comparative questions
about the possibility that we are seeing
analogous ways of understanding the
world and our place in it-analogies,
for example, between the Chinese concepts tao (way), li, and fa (law) and the
Greek nomos and physis, or between
the ways of imagining equality and hierarchy (as well as unity and difference) among human beings that are implicit in the representations of the
empire ruled by the son of heaven and
the democratic polis ruled by a political
elite.
Hsiin Tzu is an author who attempts
to clarify and extend Confucian insights
and the Confucian project of rectifying
language in opposition both to other
Confucians (e.g., Mencius) and to some
outside the school entirely (examples:
Chuang Tzu and the Mohists). By placing the Hsun Tzu at this point in the
course, we can continue working within
the tradition of Confucianism for another several weeks, this time by examining a text that is easier for students to
grasp at first reading than the Analects,
since it proceeds by connected reflection and systematic argument rather
than aphoristically, and since it is explicitly concerned with causality. At
the same time, it is more clearly rooted
in a context of an intense debate within
Chinese culture concerning the meaning
of piety and ritual and of the appropriate relationship of the human and the
divine, of the transcendent principles of
heaven or the cosmos and the humanly
conceived rules and forms of social life.
The paper to be written at this point
may be a little more substantial than
the first two, since students should now
be able both to return to the Analects
and to reconsider the Greek texts as
sources for their own delineations of
Chinese-Greek analogy and difference.
As in all the papers from here on, we
will ask students to focus on some
problem about the meaning or structure
of a given text while bearing in mind
the way in which other texts can clarify
or interestingly complicate that problem.
In reading Thucydides over the following two weeks, we can indicate
points of possible connectiofi between
the interest in discerning causes his account of the Peloponnesian war shares
with Hsiin Tzu, and their shared sense
of the possibility of a divine order that
somehow lurks within human historythough not in any simple or simply visible way: Thucydides takes his distance
from traditional Greek divination practices; Hsiin Tzu is unremittingly hostile
towards their Chinese counterparts. It
might also be suggested that Thucydides' assertion that his own written
composition is a "thing for all times,"

as well as his argument for the crucial
importance of the possibility of meaningful speech within and among poleis
raises interesting points of comparison
with Hsiin Tzu's discussion of the redemptive function of rites and music in
human life.
The next two readings, the Birds and
Helen, are a clear change of pace.
These plays serve as a kind of bridge
section of the course, separating works
that take Greek or Chinese cultural tradition seriously from those which in
one way or another appear (though perhaps it is only an appearance) to suggest radical revisions. Aristophanes'
comedy and Euripides' play are both
fantasies that draw attention to their
own status as inventive reconceptions
of the intermingling of divinity and humanity. These works of the imagination
draw attention to their attempt to open
up new ways of thinking and writing
about divinity, ways that seem to demythologize traditional accounts of
gods and heroes, of heaven and earth,
perhaps reducing the sense of distance,
and surely reducing the sense of solemnity that seems to accompany traditional Athenian piety. Do they also
subvert it?
In the last section of the course we
encounter three (or perhaps six, counting authors) extraordinary figures who
appear to live in the borderlands between divinity and humanity, each of
them singularly attractive and disconcerting: Chuang Tzu, Plato's Socrates,
and Euripides' Dionysus. The texts
considered here also firmly connect the
human awareness of divinity to the human experience of death, sometimes
elaborately horrible death.
Chuang Tzu, perhaps in a way analogous to the aporia-inducing Socrates,
seems wholeheartedly both to reject
and to endorse contemporary conventions, to pass beyond words and yet to
live within a storm of word-play, to
withdraw from the ordinary world of
mortals and yet to interrogate that
world with persistent and serious engagement. Do ironies operate in
Chuang Tzu's fables, as they may in
Socratic speech? What is the status of
the sometimes conflicting theories and
doctrines that both Chuang Tzu and
Socrates assert? Are they better understood as revered sages of Taoism and
the Higher Law respectively, or as figures who jokingly initiate us into a way
that is not quite either the tao or a
nomos?
The Bacchae is the last item on the
agenda, not because it in some way
sums up lines that will have been followed in the rest of the course, but because it contains so many interpretive
PS: Political Science & Politics

SpaceBridges:The U.S.-Soviet SpaceBridgeResourceCenter
possibilities (and so many fireworks)

that it stands a fair chance of combating any end-of-semesterdepressionthat
may infiltrateour closing discussion of
piety and death.
Philosophy/Political Science 306
Origins of Philosophy:
China and Greece
A considerationof the period between
the 6th and the 3rd centuries B.C.,
when certainindividualsin both China
and Greece began to regardcritically
and self-consciouslythe culturesin
which they lived.
Requirements:Students are expected to
do the assigned readingsbefore coming
to class; informedparticipationin class
discussionwill be an element of the
final grade. There will be four short
papers (total length:20-25 pages) as
indicatedbelow. These will be interpretive essays on the texts we consider in
class. There will be a self-scheduled
final examination.
Schedule of Readings and Papers

January26 and 28: Cho-yunHsu,

Ancient China in Transition Frank J.
Frost, Greek Society, chs. 1-5

February2 and 4: Confucius(551-479):
Anlects, esp. Chs. 1-9, 12, 13 Thucydides (about460-400):The Peloponnesian War(pp. 35-49, 72-87, 143-164,

Ethics

April 12 and 14: Hsiin Tzu and Aristotle, Parts of Animals, Book 1 (xeroxed

212-245, 400-437, 455-470, 516-537)
February 9 and 11: Confucius and

handout)
April19 and 21:Hsun TzuandAristotle

Thucydides
February16: Confuciusand Thucydides
February17: First PaperDue, 5 P.M.
February18: Chuang Tzu (between 339
and 295) Heraclitus(fl. 500) and Parmenides (fl. 475), Fragments(xeroxed
handout)

April26 and 28: Hsun Tzuand Aristotle
FinalPaperDue-Last Day for Written
Work

February 23 and 25: Chuang Tzu and

Pre-Socratics
March 1 and 3: Chuang Tzu and PreSocratics
March4: Second PaperDue, 5 P.M.
SpringBreak
March 15 and 17:Mencius (371-289?)
Plato (429-347):Phaedrus

January19: Introduction
January21: BenjaminSchwartz, Introduction and Chapter1 from The World

March 22 and 24: Mencius and
Phaedrus

handout)

Phaedrus

of Thought in Ancient China (xeroxed

April 4: ThirdPaperDue, 5 P.M.
April 5 and 7:Hsun Tzu (fl. 298-238)
Aristotle (384-322):Nicomachean
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March29 and 31: Mencius and

Space Bridges: The U.S.-Soviet

Space Bridge Resource Center

Helene Keyssar, University of California, San Diego
The airingin the Soviet Union of the
Donahue space bridgestransformed
the Soviet public's image of itself."

Interview with Vladimir Pozner,
Moscow, 1989
After Remembering War, when I

toured the Soviet Union as a musician, even in the remotestvillage,
people came up and hailed me as a
hero.

S. Frederick Starr, President,
Oberlin College, jazz clarinetist,
Sovietologist and U.S. moderator

for RememberingWar

The Growth of a Medium
During the decade 1982-92,
groups in the United States joined
with various Soviet institutions to
June 1994

develop new forms of communication between citizens of the United
States and the former Soviet
Union. They did so in an era that
began with deep mutual mistrust
and ended in bewilderment, an era
that began with the president of the
United States referring to the Soviet Union as the "evil empire,"
and ended with the dissolution of
the Soviet Union itself.
One result of efforts to exploit
and effect changing climates of
opinion in both the United States
and the Soviet Union has been the
emergence of a new cultural form
called the "space bridge." Translated from the Russian word,
telemost, a space bridge is an inter-

active television link between at
least two geographically separate
and culturally distinct locations.
In contrast to teleconferences,
space bridges are public events.
Whereas teleconferencing brings
together small groups for specialized discussions or lectures on interactive television, space bridges
are more like interactive theater, in
which the dialogue occurs between
sites as well as between key participants, moderators, and unnamed
audience members. Space bridges
provide a space in which ordinary
citizens can appear in public as a
public.
I first became interested in space
bridges in the summer of 1983.
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